Abstract-Security is an issue of paramount importance, yet is it a significant challenge for wireless communications, which becomes more intricate when facing a full duplex (FD) active eavesdropper capable of performing eavesdropping and jamming simultaneously. In this paper, we investigate the physical layer security issue in the presence of an FD active eavesdropper, who launches jamming attacks to further improve the eavesdropping. The jamming, however, also results in self-interference at the eavesdropper itself. This security problem is formulated within a hierarchical game framework where the eavesdropper acts as the leader and the legitimate user is the follower. In particular, we first investigate the follower's secrecy rate maximization problem and derive the optimal legitimate transmission strategy. Then, the leader's wiretap rate maximization is expressed as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). Leveraging the concavity of the follower's problem, we transform the MPEC problem into a single-level optimization and obtain the jamming power allocation strategy by applying the primaldual interior-point method. Moreover, we analyze the situations where only partial channel state information is available at the legitimate user and the corresponding impacts on the game. Finally, we present extensive simulation results to validate our theoretical analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION

R
ECENT years have witnessed the rapid development of wireless technology. Following the prosperity of various wireless services provided with high data rate [1] , the security issue for wireless communications has raised growing concerns [2] . However, due to the open and shared nature of wireless medium, wireless communications are extremely vulnerable to malicious attacks. Traditionally, encryption based approaches at higher protocol layers are entrusted to tackle such challenges [3] . Nevertheless, these methods, on one hand, require additional resources for key generation and management. On the other hand, with the drastically growing computation capability of wireless devices, the basic assumption that the encryption is unbreakable is seriously challenged. Towards this issue, physical layer security has emerged as a novel and attractive alternative to enhance security by exploiting the random characteristics of wireless channels. Compared with the encryption based approaches, physical layer security requires relatively low implementation complexity while is capable to provide a strict level of security. Therefore, there have been increasing research efforts in this field, for which a comprehensive survey can be found in [4] .
Conventionally, physical layer security is investigated under half-duplex (HD) transmission, as it is the very pattern applied in existing wireless systems. In HD scenarios, the adversary either stays silent and wiretaps the legitimate transmissions (a.k.a. eavesdropping) or imposes interference signals to jeopardize the legitimate transmissions (a.k.a. jamming). Towards these threats, there have been abundant research works with various effective approaches proposed. In particular, there are multi-antenna techniques [5] - [10] , cooperative security techniques [11] - [13] , and so forth to degrade eavesdropping. Also, techniques such as frequency hopping [14] , power control [15] , reactive transmissions [16] , and many others are proposed to defend jamming. While more recently, full-duplex (FD) based communications have sparked an increasing interest from both academic bodies and industry, because of its potential to double the spectral efficiency [17] , [18] . With FD technology empowering simultaneous transmissions and receptions, there come along both new opportunities and challenges for physical layer security.
While for the most existing researches, they immerse in the opportunities brought from FD technology. In particular, FD is more often applied at the legitimate user's side to enhance physical layer security, e.g. FD transmitters [19] , 0090 -6778 © 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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FD receivers [20] , [21] , and FD relays [22] - [25] . The eavesdropper, on the other hand, is still mostly based on the HD assumption, noted as a passive eavesdropper. For such scenarios, FD technology enables simultaneous transmissions and receptions or generates extra interference to jam the eavesdropper, both of which can effectively degrade the performance of eavesdropping. In contrast, the new challenges following FD technology for physical layer security, are relatively less addressed. In particular, when the adversary is equipped with FD capability, it becomes an active eavesdropper who can perform eavesdropping and jamming at the same time. This issue has been previously studied in [26] , but the authors only emphasize the optimal attack policy at the adversary. Obviously, a FD active eavesdropper will seriously challenge the wireless security, it is thus of paramount importance to investigate the security issue and countermeasure design, as well as the security performance from the interactions between the legitimate user and the adversary.
On the other hand, the majority of the research efforts in physical layer security concentrate on the study and strategy design at the legitimate users. In contrast, the modeling of eavesdroppers' behaviors is relatively simple (e.g. the effect of eavesdropping is usually reflected in the secrecy rate, which is actually a performance metric of the legitimate side, or eavesdropping simply acts as a constraint in the formulated optimization at the legitimate user), let alone the interactions between the two sides. Although this is reasonable for the passive eavesdropper model, where the eavesdropper simply stays silent and listens, it may not be so appropriate in the communication paradigms with a FD active eavesdropper. Rather, we need to take into account the specified aims of a FD active eavesdropper (e.g. to impede the legitimate transmissions or to improve eavesdropping, or others) and its corresponding strategies. More importantly, we need to ponder the resulting interactions between them to evaluate security. In this regard, game theory provides us a powerful mathematical tool, which is specially effective to study the problems among interestconflicting agents. In particular, under the game theoretical framework, we can formulate the optimization respectively for the legitimate user and FD active eavesdropper. Then by probing into the equilibrium of the game, we can then inspect the steady states from the interactions between the legitimate and adversarial sides, and highlight the strategy designs for security enhancement.
Targeting at aforementioned issues for physical layer security in the presence of a FD active eavesdropper, we in this paper investigate this problem based on game theory. Specially, we consider a novel FD active eavesdropper 1 model where the eavesdropper intends to improve the eavesdropping by launching jamming attacks. Meanwhile, facing with FD empowered jamming attacks, the legitimate user has to adapt its secure transmissions under jamming. In this regard, the eavesdropper can elaborately design the jamming strategy to stimulate the legitimate transmissions to be changed to the desired pattern for eavesdropping. However, the active jamming also results in residual self-interference at the eavesdropper itself. The legitimate user, on the contrary, attempts to protect the legitimate transmissions against the simultaneous eavesdropping and jamming attacks by smartly allocating its transmit power. In particular, the main contribution of this paper can be summarized as follows.
• We investigate the physical layer security issue for the multi-channel wireless communications in the presence of a FD active eavesdropper. We present a novel jamming-aided eavesdropping model where the eavesdropper intends to improve the wiretap rate by launching jamming attacks. The legitimate user, on the other hand, aims to maximize the secrecy rate. We consider the performance and strategy design for both sides and track their interactions within a hierarchical game (also known as Stackelberg game) framework where the eavesdropper is the leader while the legitimate user is the follower.
• For the follower's problem, we derive the optimal power allocation strategy with respect to fixed jamming power.
Since there lacks closed-form solution for the follower's problem, we formulate the leader's problem in the form of mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). By exploiting the concave properties of the follower's problem, the original bi-level MPEC can be equivalently reformulated as a single-level optimization. Solving the problem with the primal-dual interior-point method, we obtain the optimal jamming strategy for the eavesdropper. Also, we consider the case that the self-interference can be perfectly canceled and specially design a novel approach to efficiently determine the jamming power allocation.
• Moreover, we consider the game under more hostile situation for the legitimate user that it only has statistical information regarding channels of the eavesdropper. We then optimize the legitimate transmissions with respect to an outage constraint. We transform this problem into an equivalent convex optimization to solve for the optimal. The consequent problem at the eavesdropper is then formulated as a MPEC and solved in a similar way. The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we provide the literature review on the relevant topics. In Sec. III, we present the system model with the FD active eavesdropper. In Sec. IV we consider the security problem with complete information. Within the hierarchical game framework, we derive the optimal strategies for both legitimate user and eavesdropper. We in Sec. V investigate the security game with partial information. Sec. VI highlights the simulation results and Sec. VII concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
The research on physical layer security was pioneered by Wyner's work on the wiretap channel model [27] . With decades of development and progress, there have been considerable research efforts in this area [4] . Conventionally, under the HD assumption, the security threat comes from either eavesdropping or jamming. To cope with eavesdropping, we can leverage the multiple-antenna techniques to perform security-oriented beamforming to enhance the legitimate transmissions, or to transmit artificial noise to confuse the eavesdropper [28] . In [5] , the authors investigate the secrecy rate maximization problem for multiple-input singleoutput (MISO) channel. The authors of [6] design a security beamforming approach for the MISO transmissions in heterogeneous networks. In [29] , the input covariance matrix design is investigated for multi-input multi-output (MIMO) wiretap channel with globally optimal solution. Meanwhile, there are many research works based on artificial-noise methods [8] .
In [10] , the authors propose to use artificial noise for security enhancement for wireless ad hoc networks. While in [9] , a more general artificial noise assisted security approach is presented. Another category of approaches to strengthen physical layer security is cooperative security, with external help from cooperative relay nodes or friendly jammers [11] . In [12] , the authors use multiple relay nodes with cooperative beamforming to enhance security. The authors of [13] introduce both relay and jammer to maximize the secrecy rate. More recently, the security issue based on finite-alphabet input has attracted an increasing research interest. In [30] , the authors consider the MIMO channel secrecy rate with finite-alphabet input and investigate the preconding and power allocation scheme to maximize the secrecy rate. In [31] , the optimal precoding design is studied for finite-alphabet input based secrecy rate in MIMOME channels. The secrecy rate of decode-and-forward relay networks is investigated in [32] with finite-alphabet input. While the achievable secrecy region under broadcasting channel with finite-alphabet input is derived in [33] .
On the other hand, the physical layer security issue for FD transmissions is also a hot topic. In [19] , the authors propose a joint beamforming scheme over information signals and jamming signals to maximize the secrecy rate. The authors of [20] enable FD capability at the receiver to transmit jamming signals to degrade the eavesdropping while performing its own receiving. In [21] , the authors investigate the secure degree of freedom with a FD receiver under MIMO transmissions. The authors of [22] provide a comprehensive study regarding the security issue for FD relay networks. In [23] , the authors show that FD relay can help improve security on condition that self-interference can be sufficiently suppressed. The multi-hop scenario is investigate in [24] with FD relays, which shows that FD relays are more effective to guarantee security as compared with HD relays. In [25] , the authors propose to exploit the FD feature to simultaneously relay the signals and jam the eavesdropper. In [34] , the authors investigate the security performance of a multi-antenna cognitive wiretap networks, where both HD and FD transmissions are considered.
The works mentioned above all adopt the passive eavesdropper model, while the security issue in the presence of an active eavesdropper can be more challenging. Based on HD assumptions, the authors in [35] apply the game theory to tackle an active eavesdropper who switches between eavesdropping and jamming attacks. In [36] and [37] , the authors investigate the problem where an active eavesdropper perform pilot contamination to facilitate the eavesdropping during the date transmission phase. In [38] , the active eavesdropper is assumed to perform Byzantine attack to fake its channel state information to downgrade the legitimate transmissions. When the active eavesdropper is capable for FD transmissions, it can perform eavesdropping and jamming attacks simultaneously, for which the optimal attack policy is considered in [26] . We also consider the FD-based active eavesdropping issue for single-channel transmissions previously in [39] .
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a wireless network, which consists of a legitimate transmission pair, including source node S and destination node D, as well as an eavesdropper, denoted by E. There are N orthogonal channels available for the users' transmissions, denoted by N = {1, 2, · · · , N}. 2 The system is illustrated in Fig. 1 . We assume that the legitimate users, i.e., S and D, can only perform HD communications. While for the eavesdropper, the FD capability is enabled such that it can wiretap the legitimate transmissions and send jamming signals to impair the legitimate receptions simultaneously. Specifically, the legitimate source adopts power P Then the received signal at the legitimate destination and eavesdropper can be written as
respectively, where π (n) D and π (n) E are the background noise at D and E over channel-n. Then the corresponding signalto-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) for the legitimate link and wiretap link are,
and
respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume identical background noise power at D and E over all channels, given by σ 2 0 . For notation simplicity, we hereinafter define
as the channel-to-noise ratio, then the SINRs can be then
and γ
. Based on the obtained SINRs, the link capacity can be given by
for the legitimate transmissions and eavesdropping, respectively. Here unit bandwidth for the channel is assumed for simplicity. Then the secrecy capacity for the legitimate transmissions can be obtained as
where the operator ( · ) + = max ( · , 0).
IV. SECURITY GAME WITH COMPLETE INFORMATION
In this section, we investigate the security problem facing with the FD active eavesdropper. We formulate the interactions between the legitimate user and eavesdropper within a hierarchical game framework. Then, by analyzing the equilibrium of the game, we derive the optimal power allocation strategy for both parties.
A. Game Model Formulation
In the system, the legitimate user needs to send confidential messages, and thus naturally intends to maximize the secrecy capacity. The eavesdropper, on the other hand, attempts to maximize its wiretap rate. To this end, it employs the FD capability to transmit jamming signals while performing the eavesdropping. Since the legitimate user has to react to the jamming attacks by adapting its power allocation, the eavesdropper can then elaborately determines the jamming power to affect the legitimate power allocation to benefit the eavesdropping.
Based on the discussions above, we can then formulate the problem at the legitimate user as
where
is the power vector of the legitimate user. While for the eavesdropper, the problem can be formulated as
is the jamming power vector of the eavesdropper. 4 For the problems (9) and (10), we cannot simply solve them separately. Rather, the problems are coupled with each other as the jamming power policy at the eavesdropper and the legitimate power allocation at the legitimate user jointly affect the two objective functions in problems (9) and (10) . Further, we note that for the legitimate user, optimizing the legitimate power allocation will directly improve its secrecy rate. While in contrast, the eavesdropper adopt the jammingaided eavesdropping policy, where the its jamming strategy can only indirectly improve its wiretap rate by affecting the legitimate power allocation. As such, the legitimate user only need to react to the jamming attacks to optimize the secrecy rate, while the eavesdropper has to take into account the potential reactions from the legitimate user so as to optimize the jamming policy. Mathematically, the eavesdropper needs to incorporate the legitimate user's problem in part as its own problem. Such a coupling structure of the problems (9) and (10) exactly coincides with the hierarchical game that includes one leader and one follower, where the leader who moves first has to take the follower's reactions into consideration. Therefore, we adopt the hierarchical game model to jointly tackle the problems (9) and (10) where the eavesdropper acts as the leader while the legitimate user is the follower. Then the follower's problem (lower problem) is to optimize the legitimate power allocation with respect to fixed jamming attacks. While the leader's problem (upper problem) is to determine the jamming strategy with respect to the follower's reaction. 5 Moreover, despite that the jamming attacks potentially make the legitimate transmissions more favorable for the eavesdropping, it also brings the side effect of self-interference. Such a tradeoff also needs to be explored for wiretap rate maximization.
B. The Lower Problem
As we have noted previously, as the follower, the legitimate user can only react to the jamming attacks so as to maximize the legitimate transmission rate. Thus, we fix the jamming power and solve for the corresponding strategy in terms of legitimate power allocation. To this end, we rewrite the problem of (9) as follows,
are defined for notation simplicity which are functions of the fixed jamming power P
is defined as the channel set among which the legitimate user can obtain positive secrecy rate. For the problem (11), we can easily verify that it is a convex optimization problem, and thus we can easily solve it by applying the Lagrange multiplier method [41] . Specially, constructing the Lagrange function, we have
where κ ≥ 0 is the multiplier associated with the maximum power constraint. Then, the optimal solution can be obtained through the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, given as
Initialize the left and right bound for κ as κ l and κ r and threshold σ ; based on given P E , calculate a (n) and (17) is not satisfied then
S according to (18) for the remaining channels and set zero power to the excluded channels.
Then by letting
Generally, the above equation has two roots, denoted by P (n)
S− . Based on the Vieta's formulas [42] , we have P (n)
S− must be negative. On the other hand, since P
, we obtain the condition for P (n) S+ > 0, i.e., positive transmit power allocation over channel-n, is that 1 −
As we have noted before, a (n) > b (n) must be satisfied to consider the channel as usable, which turns out to be only a necessary condition. Here we obtain the sufficient and necessary condition to allocate power to a channel, which is given by (17) . Solving the equation given by (16), we obtain that the optimal power can be given as (18) , as shown at the top of the next page. While for the channel-n ∈ N \N , obviously, P
For the Lagrange multiplier, as we can easily verify that the secrecy rate is an increasing function with respect to the legitimate transmit power, and thus we know that the legitimate user must be transmitting with full power. As such, we have
Based on the above discussions, we can present the algorithm to obtain the optimal power allocation for legitimate transmission given as Algorithm 1.
Remark 1: In Algorithm 1, we apply the bi-directional search to obtain the optimal κ to conduct the legitimate power allocation, based on the fact thatP
decreasing with respect to κ. Since this algorithm is conducted with respect to fixed jamming power P E , it automatically fits the case in the presence of a passive eavesdropper, where P E = 0. On the other hand, if the condition (17) fails at all channels, which indicates the current wireless environment is not capable for secure communications, the legitimate user will then cease its transmissions and thus both secrecy rate and wiretap rate will vanish.
C. The Upper Problem
In the preceding part, we have solved the lower problem in the game and derived the optimal legitimate transmit power on condition of given jamming power. Now we deal with the upper problem at the eavesdropper to determine the optimal jamming policy. As the leader in the game, its decision making needs to take into account the follower's reactions. To this end, we apply the backward induction method to substitute the optimal legitimate power into the eavesdropper's problem (10) and obtain that max
is given by (18) . Despite that problem (20) appears as a general optimization problem, it is intricate to deal with as there lacks closed-form expression ofP
. As indicated by Algorithm 1, we can only apply numeric method for the Lagrange multiplier κ to further obtainP (n) S , which precludes the further investigation on the properties and solution of (20) in a direct manner. Consequently, we resort to the MPEC reformulation to solve for the optimal jamming strategy.
Based on the previous discussion, we know that the eavesdropper, as the leader in the hierarchical game, needs to consider not only its own strategy, but also the reaction of the follower. Through problem (20), we include the follower's reaction as part of the objective function mathematically, which is followed by significant difficulties as we have discussed. As an alternative, we can equivalently present the follower's reaction as a constraint, which leads to the MPEC problem [43] given as follows.
As indicated in (21) , the MPEC solves the optimization with part of its constraints expressed in the form of another optimization problem. Thus, the MPEC problem here is a bi-level optimization which is, generally, also complicated to be tackled. However, according to our foregoing derivations on the secrecy rate maximization problem, we know that the equilibrium constraint (21b) corresponds to a concave optimization problem. Therefore, we can apply the KKT conditions to represent the optimality equivalently, which induces the problem in the following form.
Note in (22), we also need to include the Lagrange multiplier in the lower problem, i.e., κ, as the optimization parameter. Despite that the resulting equivalent problem (22) is shown as an one-level optimization, we still cannot undertake it directly, because this problem does not satisfy the constraint qualification. Specifically, to transform the equilibrium constraint (21b), we now encompass the original constraints (9c), the complementary slackness (22c), and constraint on Lagrange multiplier (22d) all as constraints simultaneously, whose coexistence violates the constraint qualification for optimization (22) . For this issue, as we know that the secrecy rate is an increasing function with respect to the legitimate transmit power, we can then simply set the legitimate power to equal the maximum as the constraint instead of jointly consider (9c), (22c), and (22d). Therefore, we arrive at the optimization given as
where x = P T S , P T E , κ T , and
are the constraint functions which have 2N + 2 and N + 1 dimensions, respectively.
Now we obtain a regular optimization problem given as (23) , for which we can easily verify that it satisfies the linear independent constraint qualification. However, this problem is in the form of a general non-linear non-concave problem subject to both inequality and equality constraints, which impedes the solution through classical methods for convex optimizations. To solve for the optimal solution, we resort to the primal-dual interior point (PDIP) method [44] . To this end, we first introduce the slack variable s with s ≥ 0 associated with the inequality constraints and transform the problem (23) as
where we define z = x T , s T T for simplicity and the added logarithmic item is called the barrier function with the barrier parameter μ. This newly obtained problem (25) can be viewed a μ-parameterized approximation of the original problem (23) , where μ acts as the linear coefficient in the barrier function. As such, with μ approaching zero, the barrier function approaches zero, and the solution to (25) approaches that of (23) . Then for the slacked problem (25), we construct the Lagrange multiplier function as
T are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints. For the Lagrange function, the corresponding first-order optimality condition can be obtained as (27) where J H (x) and J G (x) are the Jacobi matrix of H (x) and G (x), respectively, and G and S are the diagonal matrices with respect to λ G and s, respectively, and e is the all-one vector. The expressions for the Jacobi matrix J G and J H can be specifically given as
where I N×N denotes the N × N identity matrix,
and the diagonal elements are specified as (30) and (31), as shown at the bottom of this page, respectively.
The equation (27) is noted as the primal-dual system for the optimization problem. Solving (27) 
where ζ ∈ (0, ζ max , ξ ∈ (0, ξ max are the associated steps.
To determine the steps, we first obtain the corresponding upper bounds according to
where τ is a predetermined parameter. Then, we can exploit the backtracking line search in the interval for an appropriate step size. Since the problem (25) is not a concave problem, we need to ensure that the obtained iteration provides sufficient decrease along a descent direction. To this end, we introduce the merit function for the optimization (25), given as
where ν is the penalty parameter. Based on the merit function, an iteration will be accepted as long as the following inequality holds,
T s T , and δ is a given constant.
Due to the non-concavity of the problem (25), the iteration that provides "sufficient" decrease is not guaranteed to be obtained. For such cases, we resort to the trust region method to derive the iteration step. Specifically, we solve the quadratic approximation of the non-concave optimization (27) by exploiting the first-and second-order derivatives of the Lagrange function, within the trust region. A certain step d can be accepted as long as the ratio between the actual reduction of the merit function and the predicted reduction of the merit function is grater than a threshold. If an obtained step is rejected, the trust region will be shrunk to recalculate the step. To economize the space, here we omit the details regarding trust region operation, the readers can refer to [44] and [45] for more detailed instructions.
Based on the discussions above, we can now obtain the solution to the μ-parameterized barrier problem (25) . Then, we can decrease the parameter μ for more accurate approximation to the original problem (23) . Such iterations are to be continued until the approximation is sufficiently accurate, which provides a local optimal solution to determine the jamming power strategy for the eavesdropper. Summarize the discussions above, we can present the PDIP-based approach to obtain the jamming power allocation as Algorithm 2. Due to the non-concavity, we in the algorithm first calculate the number of negative eigenvalues of the primal-dual system (32) . If the number of negative eigenvalues exceeds the number of constraints in the optimization, the trust region method will be adopted for more robust convergence property. Otherwise, we conduct the PDIP method to obtain the descent direction, where we adopt the backtracking method to determine an appropriate step size which provides sufficient decrease in terms of the merit function. If such a sufficient decrease cannot be obtained along the descent direction, we will instead resort to the trust region method.
Remark 2: We develop this algorithm by adapting the standard procedure of PDIP method to our considered problem. It may potentially return the optimal by nulling the jamming power, for which case the active eavesdropper reduces to a passive one. As such, our model can accommodate the passive eavesdropper problem as a special case.
D. Heuristic Jamming Power Allocation for the Case Without Self-Interference
Despite that we have proposed the algorithm to effectively calculate the jamming power allocation, the algorithm however, is relatively complicated. In this section, we consider the ideal case that the self-interference is completely canceled, which can be viewed as a certain approximation to the practical situation that the self-interference is sufficiently suppressed. Under such an assumption, we develop a heuristic 
jamming power allocation algorithm that can be more efficiently implemented. Obviously, from the eavesdropper's point of view, to maximize the wiretap rate without self-interference, the legitimate transmit power allocation needs to follow the water-filling method according to the eavesdropping links, given as, 6
where η is the water-level that satisfies n∈N P
(n)
S,tar = P max S . This is the most desirable situation for the eavesdropper. Consequently, the eavesdropper can elaborately adjust its jamming power over the legitimate links to make the actual 6 Here we elaborate on the case that all channel are used by the legitimate user and thus drop the (·) + operation. For the case that only part of the channels are occupied, they can be similarly discussed. legitimate power allocation (18) tends to the desired pattern given by (38) .
To facilitate the following discussions, we define the following notations,
Based on the assumption that there is no residual selfinterference, we have b (n) 1 = 0. Then the actual legitimate transmit power, given by (18) , can be simplified as (41) .
Then by jamming power allocation, the eavesdropper expectsP
S,tar for all channels. To this end, our proposed heuristic approach is based on the following facts: a) for both the actual legitimate transmit power P (n)
S n∈N
and target legitimate transmit power P (n) S,tar n∈N , the maximum power will be used, i.e., n∈NP
S,tar = P max S ; b) according to (41) , by jamming a certain channel, we can only decrease the legitimate power allocation on it and thus indirectly increase the power allocated to other channels. Then, the eavesdropper can simply jam the channels where the eavesdropping link gain is poor, which forces the legitimate user to allocated more power over the channels that are favorable for eavesdropping. Following this idea, the jamming power allocation is conducted in the following way.
First, we temporarily neglect the maximum jamming power constraint and categorize the channel set into two disjoint sets as
where |N 1 | = N 1 and N 2 = N \N 1 . Then, assuming that no jamming power is used and lettingP
S,tar for n ∈ N 1 , we can obtain the Lagrange multiplier as
In order to reach the target power allocation given by (38) for more channels, we thus choose
Then, with the Lagrange multiplier κ tar determined, we can then let the resulting transmit power allocation equal the target, i.e.,P
S,tar and obtain the jamming power allocation given as (45) for n ∈ N . Now we consider the case that the power budget at the eavesdropper is not sufficient to support the power allocation according to (45) . Intuitively, we can either try some larger multipliers from the set {κ n } n∈N 1 such that the jamming 
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power over all the channels are decreased or we can exclude some channels from jamming power allocation. In our developed algorithm, we apply both. To be specific, after the failure of power allocation with the minimum multiplier over the original channel set, we first try from the second minimum multiplier to the largest one in the the set {κ n } n∈N 1 to recalculate the power allocation. Once the maximum jamming power constraint is satisfied, we then determine the jamming power allocation with current settings. Otherwise, we try the even bigger multipliers from the set until the largest one. If the power constraint is still violated with the largest multiplier, we then exclude the channel that claims the highest power allocation from the channel set. With the shrunk channel set, we again try the multipliers from the minimum to the maximum to re-allocate the power to find a satisfactory solution. This process iterates until certain resulting power allocation satisfies the constraint. If all the channels are removed at last, which suggests that the jamming power budgets maybe too small, we simply put all the jamming power at the channel that is lastly removed. Based on the above discussion, we can summarize our heuristic approach for the jamming power allocation under the situations without self-interference as Algorithm 3.
Remark 3: Obviously, Algorithm 3 is much easier to implement as compared with Algorithm 2, which suggests that the existence of self-interference not only negatively affect the performance at the FD eavesdropper, but also complicates the optimal algorithm implementation. Also, note that if sufficient power budget is given at the eavesdropper, it can always change the legitimate transmit power allocation (18) to the mostly desired one (38) , by launching jamming attacks, which is also the optimal jamming power allocation. On the contrary, the eavesdropper can not exactly equal the power by (18) and (38) with insufficient jamming power. For such cases, the optimality is no longer guaranteed.
E. The Equilibrium
In the previous parts, we have derived the optimal legitimate power and jamming power allocation strategies for both legitimate user and eavesdropper, which constitutes the equilibrium of the game. Here we formally present the conclusions as follows.
Proposition 1: The hierarchical security game between the legitimate user and active eavesdropper always admits an equilibrium.
Proof: According to [46] , we know that for a hierarchical game, given the leader's strategy, if the follower's bestresponse strategy set is a singleton, the existence of equilibrium can be guaranteed. In our game model, the followerthe legitimate user allocates its power based on (18) , which is uniquely determined as the Lagrange multiplier κ is unique through (19) . Thus, we confirm that the equilibrium always exists.
Now we have confirmed the existence of the equilibrium. While the uniqueness of the equilibrium, however, is not guaranteed, due to the non-concavity of the optimal jamming power allocation problem at the eavesdropper (c.f. (23) , the objective is non-concave and the feasible region is nonconvex).
To obtain the equilibrium, we first let the eavesdropper -the leader in the game to obtain its optimal jamming strategyP E . Then by substitutingP E into P S P E given by (18), we can derive the power allocationP S P E for the legitimate links. Finally, P S P E ,P E constitutes the equilibrium for the hierarchical security game. Note for our considered hierarchical game that models such sequential decision making process, there is no need to update the strategies in an iterative manner between the leader and follower, and the equilibrium can be directly obtained through the one-time calculation as explained above.
Remark 4:
We here briefly discuss the extension of our framework to jointly consider the security and energy issue, for the the limited energy may be a potential bottleneck for the battery-powered users to sustain the secure transmissions. Intuitively, to jointly consider the security and energy, we can impose a linear pricing in terms of the consumed power at the original utility functions at the users. As such, the newlyobtained utility function for the legitimate user and eavesdropper are given as
E , respectively. With the basic assumption of jamming-aided eavesdropping, we can then similarly formulate the hierarchical game model. We also start from the lower problem. But the lower problem here differs with our model in that, the allocated power does not necessarily exhaust the maximum. As such, we discuss the problem in two cases. First, if the power has not been exhausted, the legitimate user can obtain the channel-specified power allocation in closed-form expression. Then the upper problem can be solved with backward induction method after substituting the closed-form lower solution into the upper problem. Otherwise, the maximum power is used, then there is no closed-form solution achievable at the lower layer, and we again resort to the MPEC reformulation to solve for the jamming power allocation. Mathematically, the MPEC formulation automatically reduces to the backward induction if the optimization-based constraint has a closed-form solution. As such, the first case can be viewed as a special case of MPEC formulation. Therefore, we can see that our formulated MPEC model can be easily extended to jointly tackle the security and energy issue.
Remark 5: Based on our previous investigation on the model with one legitimate user and one eavesdropper, we here briefly discuss the extension of our model to the more complicated wireless scenarios that incorporate multiple legitimate users. For this case, we simply assume that all the legitimate users have the security concerns due to the existence of the eavesdropper while the eavesdropper is only interested in the transmissions of one legitimate user. Correspondingly, we can formulate the one-leader multi-follower hierarchical game to investigate this problem. For this game, the lower problem constitutes multiple secrecy rate optimization at different legitimate users which are coupled with each other. In this regard, we can adopt the non-cooperative game model to formulate the lower problem, where the legitimate users compete with each other for their own secrecy rate maximization. Note this non-cooperative game is parameterized by the eavesdropper's jamming power, i.e., the strategy of the leader. Thus, the Nash equilibrium of the lower non-cooperative game is also a function of the upper jamming power. For the leader's problem, we can similarly adopt the MPEC formulation. Compared with our formulation given by (21) for the oneleader one-follower game, the MPEC here requires the Nash equilibrium of the lower non-cooperative secrecy game as its constraint. While in contrast, in (21) we only need to consider the optimality of a single legitimate user as the constraint. Despite such a difference, we can still apply the similar analysis and algorithm design as in our work to solve for the optimal jamming strategy. Therefore, we conclude that our proposed hierarchical game and MPEC based analysis are of high scalability undertake more complicated security problems.
V. SECURITY GAME WITH PARTIAL INFORMATION
In this section, we investigate the more challenging security problem with consideration over the information asymmetry on channel uncertainties. In particular, we consider the more disadvantaged case for the legitimate user that it has only partial channel state information. In particular, the legitimate user knows exactly the channel state information regarding the legitimate links and interference through the jamming links, which are related to the legitimate receiver. But it only has statistical information on the eavesdropping links and self-interference links that involve the receiving at the eavesdropper. In contrast, the eavesdropper, as the leader in the game, still has access to complete channel state information over all links in the system. As the eavesdropper still applies the jamming-aided eavesdropping strategy, we here also adopt the hierarchical game model to analyze the problem and derive the equilibrium as the solution.
A. Game Model Formulation
To model the channel uncertainty, here we consider that the wireless channels are quasi-static and follow Rayleigh flat fading. Consequently, we know that for each channel, α
where β (n) XY denotes the large scale fading over channel-n from X to Y . In accordance with our assumption, the eavesdropper knows the instantaneous channel state, i.e., all α (n) XY , X ∈ {S, E}, Y ∈ {D, E}. While practically, the legitimate user can get the information on the legitimate links by local channel estimation. Further, based on the knowledge on the legitimate links and measured aggregate power at the receiver, it obtains the information on the experienced jamming power. However, for the wiretap links and selfinterference links, the legitimate user can hardly obtain the accurate information. As such, we assume that only the statistical information regarding the eavesdropping links and selfinterference links are available. In other words, the legitimate user only knows β (n)
S E and β (n)
E E but has no knowledge of exact α
Since there lacks complete information at the legitimate user, we then cannot simply adopt the secrecy capacity as the metric as we have done in the previous section. Instead, we here consider that the legitimate user specifies a desired secrecy rate, denoted by R (n) S over channel-n. Correspondingly, we introduce the outage probability, defined as
for channel-n. Note the outage here concerns the uncertainty of the wiretap link and self-interfering link at the eavesdropper. Reasonably, we need to specify an outage constraint for the user to represent the security requirement. Therefore, we can present the problem for the legitimate user as
where the constraint (47b) presents the outage constraint and is the outage probability threshold. Without loss of generality, we assume it is identical for all channels.
For the eavesdropper, since the basic assumptions are the same with those in the previous section, the formulation remains the same as well, which is given by (10) . Then, the problems (47) and (10) constitute the hierarchical game model where, similar as before, the eavesdropper is the leader and the legitimate user is the follower.
B. The Equilibrium
To solve the game model, we first assume the fixed eavesdropper's strategy and solve the legitimate user's problem, i.e., to solve (47) with respect to fixed P E . To this end, considering the outage constraint, we can rewrite the constraint in the following,
by the legitimate user, and F
is the corresponding inverse. Based on the knowledge of Rayleigh fading, we can then obtain F γ
Then, based on (49), we can calculate that
where c (n) is given by
and W (·) denotes the principle Lambert W function [47] . With the deviations presented above, the legitimate side's problem can be transformed as
where a (n) is defined by (12) and c (n) is given by (51), both of which are functions of P
E . Revisit the problem (11) for the case with complete information and the problem (52) here for the case with partial information, we notice that the two problem share the same structure, with the only difference lies in that b (n) in (11) is replaced by c (n) in (52). For c (n) , we can easily see that it is a monotonous function against the outage threshold . In particular, when → 0, c (n) → +∞, this corresponds to the case with unreachable high security requirement and thus the legitimate user ceases the transmissions. While when → 1, c (n) → 0, then the legitimate power allocation reduces to the water-filling scheme in the presence of the jamming attacks without any consideration over the eavesdropping. Therefore, we can see that compared with the legitimate power allocation under complete information assumption, the legitimate power allocation with partial information becomes more conservative with smaller , while becomes more aggressive towards waterfilling with larger .
Due to the fact that the problem (52) has the same structure with that of (11), we can use the same approach as stated in Algorithm 1 to derive the optimal legitimate transmit power. The power allocation also has the similar expression as (18) , which only differs in that b (n) in (18) needs to be replaced by c (n) . Here we omit the details for space limitation. Furthermore, as the legitimate user's problem has the same concave property as before, the eavesdropper's problem can then also be formulated as a MPEC problem and solved following the procedures presented in Algorithm 2. Here we omit the detailed discussions so as to economize the space.
Based on the discussions above, we can arrive at the conclusion below.
Proposition 2: The hierarchical security game with partial information at the legitimate user always admits an equilibrium.
Proof: This proposition can be similarly proved as Proposition 1, which is based on the fact that the solution to (47) is unique.
Also similar to the conclusion regarding the uniqueness of equilibrium for the game with complete information, the uniqueness of equilibrium for the game with partial information here is not guaranteed, either. This results from the complex optimization at the leader where the objective is non-concave and the feasible region is non-convex.
To obtain the equilibrium, we first solve the leader's problem to derive the optimal jamming strategyP E . Then, we substitute it into the legitimate user's strategy for the optimal legitimate transmit power allocationP S P E . Finally, the equilibrium of the game can be obtained as P S P E ,P E .
Remark 6: For the security problem considered in this paper, an implicit assumption is that we only consider the jamming attacks happen during the data transmission phase. However, it is possible that the jamming attacks occur during the channel estimation and feedback, which results in inaccurate information on the legitimate links and jamming links at the legitimate user. In this regard, the potential errors regarding the legitimate links and jamming links together with the statistical information on the eavesdropping links and self-interference links constitute an even more disadvantaged wireless scenario for the legitimate transmissions. As such, the security issue and countermeasure design deserve special research efforts, for which we leave it to the future work for further investigation.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present the simulation results to demonstrate the security performance in the presence of an active eavesdropper. For the results below, the simulation parameters are based on the following settings unless otherwise noted. We consider the system topology as shown in Fig. 1 . The legitimate source node locates at the origin while the legitimate receiver has the coordinates (100, 0) (all distances are in meters). The eavesdropper is placed at (50, −120). Also, we assume unit distance between the transmitting antenna and receiving antennas at the eavesdropper. There are 5 orthogonal channels available for transmissions, which are of unit bandwidth. The wireless transmissions suffer from power attenuation with path loss index being 4 and independent Rayleigh fading at different channels. The power budget at the legitimate user and eavesdropper is 1 W and the background noise power is assumed to be −100 dBW. As we specially focus on the FD active eavesdropper in this paper, we in the simulations have the cases corresponding to the passive eavesdropper as baselines. The provided results are averaged over 10 000 simulation trails.
We first evaluate the security performance under different coefficients of self-interference. The results are provided in Figs. 2, 3, 4 , and 5, where for the cases with partial information, we set the outage threshold as 0.1. We can see in Fig. 2 , as expected, the jamming power of the eavesdropper decreases drastically with stronger self-interference. When the self-interference becomes sufficiently high, the active eavesdropper gradually reduces to a passive eavesdropper, ceasing the jamming attacks. Also evidently, we can see that, the jamming power at the eavesdropper facing with a completely informed legitimate user is much higher than the case with a partially informed legitimate user. This can be explained as follows. We know that the legitimate user will always transmit with the maximum power, whether it has complete information or partial information (unless all channels are unusable for positive secrecy rate.) Thus the eavesdropper can only improve the eavesdropping by "misleading" the legitimate user to allocate the power in a more eavesdropping-favorable way, for which it launches jamming attacks. Facing with a partially informed legitimate user, which only reacts based on the statistical information at the eavesdropper (cf. problem (9) vs. problem (52)), the effectiveness of the "misleading" is weakened, indicating that the legitimate user becomes more "sluggish" to respond to jamming attacks. As such, the jamming power is lowered with respect to the partially informed legitimate user since the jamming attack is not as effective as in the case with a complete informed legitimate user.
The results regarding legitimate transmit power allocation is shown in Fig. 3 . As we have noted, The legitimate user always transmits with full power, regardless of information asymmetry. Then we know that, when the legitimate user only has partial channel state information, there is about 5% chance (as the full power is 1 W, while the legitimate transmission under this case consumes 0.95 W on average) that it will cease the transmission as all the channels are not affordable to achieve positive secrecy rate. This mainly accounts for the outage constraint, which we will explain later for the results provided in Fig. 7 .
In Figs. 4 and 5, we show the performance in terms of wiretap rate and secrecy rate, which are the optimization goal at the eavesdropper and legitimate user, respectively. As suggested by Fig. 2 , the active eavesdropper tends passive as the self-interference becomes stronger, which is also verified by the results here, as the wiretap rate and secrecy rate under active eavesdropping approach the same with those under passive eavesdropping with respect to high self-interference. Also, as we have explained, the effectiveness of jamming attacks to improve the eavesdropping becomes weaker as faced with a partially informed legitimate user, the wiretap rate is accordingly lower. Also note that the wiretap rate achieved by the heuristic algorithm is lower than than the optimal one when the self-interference is lower, because the heuristic algorithm only provides a suboptimal solution for the active jamming with respect to a completely informed legitimate user. While when the self-interference becomes stronger, as we do not consider the self-interference when conducting the heuristic algorithm, it thus achieves higher wiretap rate than the optimal solution, which has to lower the jamming power (see Fig. 2 ) to reduce the self-interference. For the secrecy rate, from Fig. 5 , we can observe significant secrecy loss due to active jamming attacks. However, as the self-interference becomes stronger, the secrecy loss due to jamming is decreased, because the the eavesdropper turns more conservative to launch jamming attacks. Moreover, further considering the case that the selfinterference can be completed eliminated, we notice that the secrecy loss due to jamming, even under a suboptimal algorithm, will be significantly enlarged.
We then specially consider the cases with a partially informed legitimate user and show the performance under different outage thresholds. The results are shown in Figs. 6, 7, 8, and 9 , where we fix the coefficient of selfinterference at −100 dB. Before we analyze the results here, we first consider the impact of the outage threshold from a theoretical perspective. Noticing c (n) is a function of (cf. (51)), we can easily derive that, c (n) approaches infinity as approaches 0, while c (n) approaches the 0 as approaches 1. Then we know that, when the outage threshold is sufficiently small, c (n) ≥ a (n) holds for all channels. Under this circumstance, the legitimate transmission will be ceased as no positive secrecy rate is allowed. The results in Fig. 7 verify our analysis, as when the outage threshold is lower, there is higher probability that the secret transmission cannot be achieved, and thus the average transmit power is lower. This also explains the lower average transmit power in the cases with partial information as shown in Fig. 3 . Consequently, when the outage threshold is low, the eavesdropper also reduces the chance to launch jamming attacks. In this way, the eavesdropper attempts to avoid the situations that the legitimate transmissions are completely ceased, under which case it has nothing to eavesdrop and thus against its goal to maximize the wiretap rate. Therefore, we can see in Fig. 6 that the jamming power decreases with smaller outage threshold.
In Figs. 8 and 9 , we depict the achieved wiretap rate and secrecy rate. We can see that both the wiretap rate and secrecy rate increase with loosened outage constraint. Particularly, for the wiretap rate, we can see that when the outage threshold becomes sufficiently large, the wiretap rate achieved under partial information case can be even higher than that under complete information cases. This is because that, when the outage threshold increases, the anti-eavesdropping effect in terms of legitimate power allocation is weakened. Consider the extreme case that = 1 and thus c (n) = 0, then the legitimate power allocation reduces to the water-filling approach under jamming attacks, the anti-eavesdropping is completely out of consideration. Consequently, the wiretap rate can be relatively higher. For secrecy rate, as the average legitimate transmit power increases with outage threshold (Fig. 7) , the achieved secrecy rate is also higher. But for the cases with partial information, the reduced anti-eavesdropping effect makes the achieved secrecy rate lower than that for the corresponding cases with complete information.
Finally, we inspect the security performance under different channel conditions with the results provided in Figs. 10, 11, 12 , and 13. Here we consider the eavesdropper moves from the coordinates (0, −120) to (100, −120) and evaluate the performance along the line. Also, we fix the coefficient of self-interference at −100 dB and the outage threshold 0.1. As the eavesdropper moves from left to right, the jamming channel is improved while the eavesdropping channel is worsened. As a result, we can see in Fig. 10 that the jamming power increases as the eavesdropper moves. Specially, for the case with a completely informed legitimate user, the jamming power can be evidently higher than the case with respect to a partially informed legitimate user. For the legitimate transmit power shown in Fig.11 , similar to the results in Fig. 7 , when the eavesdropper moves farther from the legitimate source node, the chance that no positive secrecy rate can he achieved is reduced, and thus the legitimate user has higher chance for full power transmissions, which induces higher average transmit power.
In Fig. 12 , we demonstrate the wiretap rate. For the passive eavesdropper with a completely informed legitimate user, the wiretap rate keeps decreasing as the wiretap link gets worse with the eavesdropper moves from left to right. While in contrast, when the passive eavesdropper faces a partially informed legitimate user, the achieved wiretap rate first increases and then decreases. To explain this counterintuitive phenomenon, we look back (51). We can easily derive that c (n) approaches β (n) S E log 1 as P
(n)
E approaches zero (cf. lim x→+∞ W (ax exp (x)) − x = log a). As such, c (n) is on average log 1 times over b (n) . This indicates that a partially informed legitimate user is more likely to regard a channel as unusable (cf. (17) with b (n) replaced by c (n) ) than a completely informed legitimate user does. Consequently, when the eavesdropper locates near the legitimate source, the partially informed legitimate user will be more likely to cease the transmission, which further results in zero wiretap rate at the eavesdropper (also suggested by Fig. 11) . Such an effect is weakened as the eavesdropper moves farther away, which induces temporary wiretap rate increment. As the eavesdropper moves even farther, the wiretap link degradation becomes the dominant factor, which again reduces the wiretap rate. Thus, different from the case with a completely informed legitimate user, where the nearer the eavesdropper-source distance, the higher wiretap rate, for the case with a partially informed legitimate user, there exists a tradeoff in terms of location to achieve the highest wiretap rate. On the other hand, for the cases facing an active eavesdropper, the wiretap rate can be generally improved by jamming attacks. In particular, for the case that active eavesdropper facing with a complete informed legitimate user, as the eavesdropper moves, the wiretap link gain becomes worse while the jamming channel gets better, which indicates that the eavesdropper is degraded but the jamming attack can more effectively influence the legitimate transmissions. Such a tradeoff also results in an optimal location for the eavesdropper to achieve the highest wiretap rate. Moreover, we notice that, when the eavesdropper is near the source, the wiretap rate achieved for the case with a complete informed legitimate user is higher than that for the case with a partially informed legitimate user. When the eavesdropper locates near the destination, the opposite holds. This is because that when near the destination, the jamming power will be considerably higher (see Fig. 10 ), which induces higher selfinterference and further jeopardizes the eavesdropping at the eavesdropper itself.
In Fig. 13 , we show the achieved secrecy rate of the legitimate user, where we can clearly see the secrecy degradation due to jamming attacks and information asymmetry. As the eavesdropper moves from left to right, with the wiretap link worsened, the secrecy loss due to incomplete information is reduced. On the contrary, the eavesdropper's moving from left to right improves the jamming channel and thus enlarges the secrecy loss due to jamming attacks. When the two factor combines, we can see considerable secrecy performance degradation in terms of the legitimate transmissions.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigate the physical layer security issue in the presence of a FD active eavesdropper. The eavesdropper employs its FD capability to launch jamming attacks to assist the eavesdropping. Within a hierarchical game framework, we obtain the optimal strategy for both the legitimate transmissions and the jamming attacks. Simulation results suggest that the FD active eavesdropping imposes a more significant challenge as compared with conventional passive eavesdropping for secure wireless transmissions. Also, it shows that the self-interference is the dominant factor for the performance of the FD active eavesdropper.
